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Abstract
W ed e v e l o pt e s t sf o rc o m m o nv a l u e sa tﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are
nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and
are based on the fact that the “winner’s curse” arises only in common values auctions.
The tests build on recently developed methods for using observed bids to estimate
each bidder’s conditional expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium
behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations are invariant to the
number of opponents each bidder faces, while with common values they are decreasing in
the number of opponents. This distinction forms the basis of our tests. We consider both
exogenous and endogenous variation in the number of bidders. Monte Carlo experiments
show that our tests can perform well in samples of moderate sizes. We apply our tests
to two diﬀerent types of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. For unit-price (“scaled”)
sales often argued to ﬁt a private values model, our tests consistently fail to ﬁnd evidence
of common values. For “lumpsum” sales, where ap r i o r iarguments for common values
appear stronger, our tests yield mixed evidence against the private values hypothesis.
Keywords: ﬁrst-price auctions, common values, private values, nonparametric testing,
winner’s curse, stochastic dominance, endogenous participation, timber auctions
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
At least since the inﬂuential work of Hendricks and Porter (1988), studies of auction data
have played an important role in demonstrating the empirical relevance of economic models
of strategic interaction between agents with asymmetric information. However, a funda-
mental issue remains unresolved: how to choose between private and common values models
of bidders’ information. In a common values auction, information about the value of the
object for sale is spread among bidders; hence, a bidder would update his assessment of the
value of winning if he learned the private information of an opponent. In a private values
auction, by contrast, opponents’ private information would be of interest to a bidder only
for strategic reasons–learning an opponent’s assessment of the good would not aﬀect his
beliefs about his own valuation.
In this paper we propose nonparametric tests to distinguish between the common values
(CV) and private values (PV) paradigms based on observed bids at ﬁrst-price sealed-bid
auctions. The distinction between these paradigms is fundamental in the theoretical lit-
erature on auctions, with important implications for bidding strategies and the design of
markets. While intuition is often oﬀered for when one might expect a private or common
values model to be more appropriate, a more formal approach would be valuable in many
applications. In fact, discriminating between common and private values was the motiva-
tion behind Paarsch’s (1992) pioneering work on structural estimation of auction models.
More generally, models in which strategic agents’ private information leads to adverse se-
lection (a common values auction being just o n ee x a m p l e )h a v ep l a y e dap r o m i n e n tr o l e
in the theoretical economics literature, yet the prevalence and signiﬁcance of this type of
informational asymmetry is not well established empirically. Because a ﬁrst-price auction is
a market institution particularly well captured by a tractable theoretical model, data from
these auctions oﬀer a promising opportunity to test for adverse selection using structure
obtained from economic theory.
Several testing approaches explored previously rely heavily on parametric assumptions
about the distribution functions governing bidders’ private information (e.g. Paarsch (1992),
Sareen (1999)). Such tests necessarily confound evaluation of the economic hypotheses of
interest with evaluation of parametric distributional assumptions. Some prior work (e.g.,
Gilley and Karels (1981)) has suggested examining variation in bid levels with the number
of bidders as a test for common values. However, Pinkse and Tan (2002) have recently
shown that this type of reduced-form test generally cannot distinguish CV from PV mod-
els in ﬁrst-price auctions: in equilibrium, strategic behavior can cause bids to increase or
decrease in the number of opponents under either paradigm. We overcome both of these2
limitations by taking a nonparametric structural approach, exploiting the relationships be-
tween observable bids and bidders’ latent expectations implied by equilibrium bidding in a
model that nests the private and common values frameworks. Unlike tests of particular PV
or CV models (e.g., Paarsch (1992), Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003)), our approach
enables testing a null hypothesis including all PV models within the standard aﬃliated val-
ues framework (Milgrom and Weber (1982)) against an alternative including all CV models
in that framework. The price we pay for these advantages is reliance on an assumption of
equilibrium bidding. This is not an innocuous assumption. However, a ﬁrst-price auction
is a market institution that seems particularly well suited to this structural approach.
The importance of tests for common values to empirical research on auctions is further
emphasized by recent results showing that CV models are identiﬁed only under strong con-
ditions on the underlying information structure or on the types of data available (e.g., Athey
and Haile (2002)). Hence, a formal method for determining whether a CV or PV model
is more appropriate could oﬀer an important diagnostic tool for researchers hoping to use
demand estimates from bid data to guide the design of markets. Laﬀont and Vuong (1996)
have observed that any common values model is observationally equivalent to some private
values model, suggesting that such testing is impossible. However, they did not consider
the possibilities of binding reserve prices or variation in the numbers of bidders, either of
which could aid in distinguishing between the private and common values paradigms.
Our tests exploit variation in the number of bidders and are based on detecting the eﬀects
of the winner’s curse on equilibrium bidding. The winner’s curse is an adverse selection
phenomenon arising in CV but not PV auctions. Loosely, winning a CV auction reveals to
the winner that he was more optimistic about the object’s value than his opponents were.
This “bad news” (Milgrom (1981)) becomes worse as the number of opponents increases–
having the most optimistic signal among many bidders implies (on average) even greater
over-optimism than does being most optimistic among a few bidders. A rational bidder
anticipates this bad news and adjusts his expectation of the value of winning (and, therefore,
his bid) accordingly. In a PV auction, by contrast, the value a bidder places on the object
does not depend on his opponents’ information, so the number of bidders does not aﬀect
his expected value of the object conditional on winning. Relying on this distinction, our
testing approach is based on detecting the adjustments rational bidders make in order to
avoid the winner’s curse as the number of competitors changes. This is nontrivial because we
can observe only bids, and variation in the level of competition aﬀects the aggressiveness
of bidding even in a PV auction. However, economic theory enables us to separate this
competitive response from responses (if any) to the winner’s curse.3
We consider several statistical tests, all involving distributions of bidders’ expected val-
uations (actually, particular conditional expectations of their valuations) in auctions with
varying numbers of bidders. In a PV environment, these distributions should not vary with
the number of bidders, whereas the CV alternative implies a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
relation. Our testing problem is complicated by the fact that we cannot compare empirical
distributions of bidders’ expectations directly; rather, we can only compare empirical distri-
butions of estimates of these expectations, obtained using nonparametric methods recently
developed by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) (hereafter GPV) and extended by Li,
Perrigne, and Vuong (2002), Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) (together, LPV hereafter) and
by Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) (hereafter HPP). This nonparametric ﬁrst stage
raises several issues that can signiﬁcantly complicate the asymptotic distributions of test
statistics. A further complication arising in many applications is the endogeneity of bidder
participation. After developing our tests for the base case of exogenous participation, we
consider several standard models of endogenous participation and provide conditions under
which our tests can be adapted.
While our testing approach is new, we are not the ﬁrst to explore implications of the
winner’s curse as an approach for distinguishing PV from CV models. Hendricks, Pinkse
and Porter (2003, footnote 2) suggest a testing approach applicable when there is a binding
reserve price, in addition to several tests of a pure common values model that are applicable
when one observes, in addition to bids, the ex post realization of the object’s value. Although
our tests are applicable when there is a binding reserve price, this is not required–an
important advantage in many applications, including the drilling rights auctions studied by
HPP and the timber auctions we study below. In addition, our tests require observation only
of the bids–the only data available from most ﬁrst-price auctions. For second-price and
English auctions, Paarsch (1991) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) have considered testing
for the winner’s curse using a simple regression approach. However, second-price sealed-
bid auctions are uncommon in practice, and the applicability of this approach to English
auctions is limited by the fact that the winner’s willingness to pay is never revealed (creating
a missing data problem) and further by ambiguity regarding the appropriate interpretation
of losing bids (e.g., Bikhchandani, Haile, and Riley (2002), Haile and Tamer (2003)). Athey
and Haile’s (2002) study of identiﬁcation in auction models includes suﬃcient conditions
for discriminating between common and private values. However, they focus on cases in
which only a subset of the bids is observable, consider only exogenous participation, and do
not develop formal statistical tests.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the4
underlying model, the method for inferring bidders’ expectations of their valuations from
observed bids, and the main principle of our testing approach. In section 3 we provide
the details of two types of tests and develop the necessary asymptotic theory. In section
4 we report the results of Monte Carlo experiments demonstrating the performance of
our tests. In section 5 we show how the tests can be extended to environments with
endogenous participation, and section 6 presents an approach for incorporating auction-
speciﬁc covariates. Section 7 then presents the empirical application to U.S. Forest Service
auctions of timber harvesting contracts, where we consider data from two types of sales
that diﬀer in ways that seem likely ap r i o r ito aﬀect the signiﬁcance of any common value
elements. We conclude in section 8.
2 Model and Testing Principle
The underlying theoretical framework is Milgrom and Weber’s (1982) general aﬃliated
values model. Throughout we denote random variables in upper case and their realizations
in lower case. We use boldface to denote vectors. An auction has N ∈ {n...¯ n} risk-neutral
bidders, with n ≥ 2. Each bidder i has a valuation Ui ∈ (u,u) for the object and observes
a private signal Xi ∈ (x,x) of this valuation. We let X−i denote the vector of signals of
i’s opponents. Valuations and signals have joint distribution ˜ Fn(U1,...,U n,X 1,...,X n),
which is assumed to have a positive joint density on (u,u)n×(x,x)n.W em a k et h ef o l l o w i n g
standard assumptions (see Milgrom and Weber (1982)).
Assumption 1 (Symmetry) ˜ Fn (U1,...,U n,X 1,...,X n) is exchangeable with respect to
the indices 1,...,n.1
Assumption 2 (Aﬃliation) U1,...,U n,X 1,...,X n are aﬃliated.
Assumption 3 (Nondegeneracy) E[Ui|Xi = x,X−i = x−i] is strictly increasing in x ∀x−i.
Initially, we also assume that the number of bidders is not correlated with bidder valu-
ations or signals:2
Assumption 4 (Exogenous Participation) For each n<¯ n and all (u1,...,u n,x 1,...,x n),
˜ Fn (u1,...,u n,x 1,...,x n)= ˜ F¯ n(u1,...,u n,∞,...,∞,x 1,...,x n,∞,...,∞).
1We discuss relaxation of the symmetry assumption in section 8.
2This assumption is not made by Milgrom and Weber (1982) because they consider ﬁxed n.5
Such exogenous variation in the number of bidders will arise naturally in some applications
but not others (cf. Athey and Haile (2002) and section 5 below). Endogenous participation
will be considered in section 5 after results for this base case are presented.
A seller conducts a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction for a single object; i.e., sealed bids are
collected from all bidders, and the object is sold to the high bidder at a price equal to his
own bid.3 Under Assumptions 1—3, in an n-bidder auction there exists a unique symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each bidder employs a strictly increasing strategy sn(·).
Assuming equilibrium bidding by his opponents, bidder i chooses his bid b to maximize
E [(Ui − b)1{sn(xj) ≤ b ∀j 6= i}|Xi = xi]
As shown by Milgrom and Weber (1982), the ﬁrst-order condition characterizing the equi-














Fn(·|x) is the distribution of the maximum signal among a given bidder’s opponents condi-
tional on his own signal being x,a n dfn(·|x) is the corresponding conditional density.
The conditional expectation v(x,x,n) in (1) gives a bidder’s expectation of his valuation
conditional on his signal and on his equilibrium bid being pivotal. Our testing approach
is based on the fact that this expectation is decreasing in n whenever valuations contain a
common value element. To show this, we ﬁrst formally deﬁne private and common values.4
Deﬁnition 1 Bidders have private values iﬀ E[Ui|X1,...,X n]=E[Ui|Xi]; bidders have
common values iﬀ E[Ui|X1,...,X n] strictly increases in Xj for j 6= i.
Note that the deﬁnition of common values incorporates a wide range of models with a
common value component, not just the special case of pure common values, where the value
of the object is unknown but identical for all bidders.5
3We describe the auction as one in which bidders compete to buy. The translation to the procurement
setting, where bidders compete to sell, is straightforward.
4Aﬃliation implies that E[Ui|X1,...,X n] is nondecreasing in all Xj, and symmetry implies that when
the expectation strictly increases in some Xj,j6= i,i tm u s ts t r i c t l yi n c r e a s ei na l lXj,j6= i. For simplicity
our deﬁnition of common values excludes cases in which the winner’s curse arises for some realizations of
signals but not others. Without this, the results below would still hold but with weak inequalities replacing
some strict inequalities. Up to this simpliﬁcation, our PV and CV deﬁnitions characterize a partition of the
set of models falling in Milgrom and Weber’s (1982) aﬃliated values framework.
5Our terminology corresponds to that used by, e.g., Klemperer (1999) and Athey and Haile (2002),
although it is not the only one used in the literature. Some authors reserve the term “common values”6
The following theorem gives the key result enabling discrimination between PV and CV
models.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1—4, v(x,x,n) is invariant to n for all x in a PV model
but strictly decreasing in n for all x in a CV model.
Proof: Given symmetry, we focus on bidder 1 without loss of generality. With private
values, E[U1|X1,...,X n]=E[U1|X1], which does not depend on n. With common values
v(x,x,n) ≡ E [U1|X1 = X2 = x,X3 ≤ x,...,X n−1 ≤ x,Xn ≤ x]
= EXn≤xE [U1|X1 = X2 = x,X3 ≤ x,...,X n−1 ≤ x,Xn]
<E XnE [U1|X1 = X2 = x,X3 ≤ x,...,X n−1 ≤ x,Xn]
= E [U1|X1 = X2 = x,X3 ≤ x,...,X n−1 ≤ x]
≡ v(x,x;n − 1)
with the inequality following from the deﬁnition of common values. ¤
Informally, in equilibrium a rational bidder adjusts his expectation of his valuation down-
ward to reﬂect the fact that he wins only when his own signal is higher than those of all
opponents. The size of this adjustment depends on the number of opponents: the infor-
mation that the maximum signal among n is equal to x implies a higher expectation of Ui
than the information that the maximum among m>nis equal to x. Hence, the conditional
expectation v(x,x,n) decreases in n.
2.1 Structural Interpretation of Observed Bids
To use Theorem 1 to test for common values, we must be able to infer or estimate the
latent expectations v(xi,x i,n) for bidders in auctions with varying numbers of participants.
We assume that for each n the researcher observes the bids B1,...,B n from Tn n-bidder
auctions. We let T =
P
n Tn and assume that for all n, Tn
T → ρn ∈ (0,1) as T →∞ .B e l o w
we will add the auction index t ∈ {1,...,T} to the notation deﬁned above as necessary.
For simplicity we initially assume an identical object is sold at each auction. As shown
by GPV, standard nonparametric techniques can be applied to control for auction-speciﬁc
covariates. Below we will also suggest a more parsimonious alternative that may be more
for the special case we call pure common values and use the term “interdependent values” (e.g., Krishna
(2002)) or the less accurate “aﬃliated values” for the class of models we call common values. Additional
confusion sometimes arises because the partition of the Milgrom-Weber framework into CV and PV models
is only one of two partitions that might be of interest, the other being deﬁned by whether bidders’ signals
are independent. Note in particular that dependence of bidders’ signals is neither necessary nor suﬃcient
for common values.7
useful in applications with many covariates. We assume throughout that each auction is
independent of all others.6
As pointed out by GPV, the strict monotonicity of sn(·) implies that in equilibrium the






where Gn(·|sn(x)) is the equilibrium distribution of the highest bid among i’s competitors
conditional on i’s equilibrium bid being sn(x), and gn (·|sn (x)) is the corresponding condi-






For simplicity we will refer to the expectation v(xi,x i,n) on the left side of (4) as bidder
i’s “value.” Although these values are not observed directly, the joint distribution of bids
is. Hence, the ratio
Gn(·|·)
gn(·|·) is nonparametrically identiﬁed. Because xi = s−1
n (bi), equation






is identiﬁed as well. This need not be suﬃcient
to identify the model (i.e., to identify ˜ Fn(·)); however, identiﬁcation of the distribution of
values v(Xi,X i,n)w i l lb es u ﬃcient for our purpose.
To address estimation, let Bit denote the bid made by bidder i at auction t,a n dl e t
B∗
it represent the highest bid among i’s opponents. GPV and LPV suggest nonparametric
estimates of the form
ˆ Gn(b;b)=
1

































Here hG and hg are bandwidths and K(·)i sak e r n e l . ˆ Gn(b;b)a n dˆ gn(b;b) are nonparametric
estimates of




it ≤ m,Bit ≤ b)|m=b
and




it ≤ m,Bit ≤ b)|m=b
6This is a standard assumption, but one that serves to qualify almost all empirical studies of bidding,
where data are taken from auctions in which bidders compete repeatedly over time.8








ˆ gn(b;b) is a consistent estimator of
Gn(b|b)
gn(b|b) . Hence, by evaluating ˆ Gn(·,·)a n dˆ gn(·,·)a te a c h
observed bid, we can construct a pseudo-sample of consistent estimates of the realizations
of each Vit ≡ v(Xit,X it,n)u s i n g( 4 ) :




This possibility was ﬁrst articulated for the independent private values model by Laﬀont
and Vuong (1993) and GPV, and has been extended to aﬃliated values models by LPV and
HPP. Following this literature, we refer to each estimate ˆ vit as a “pseudo-value.”
2.2 Main Principle of the Test
Each pseudo-value ˆ vit obtained from (7) is an estimate of v(xit,x it,n t). If we have pseudo-
values from auctions with diﬀerent numbers of bidders, we can exploit Theorem 1 to develop
at e s t . L e tFv,n(·) denote the distribution of the random variable Vit = v(Xit,X it,n).
Because Fv,n(v)=P r( v(Xit,X it,n) ≤ v), Theorem 1 and Assumption 4 immediately imply
that under the PV hypothesis, Fv,n(·)m u s tb et h es a m ef o ra l ln, while under the CV
alternative, Fv,n(v)m u s ts t r i c t l yi n c r e a s ei nn for all v.
Corollary 1 Under the private values hypothesis
Fv,n(v)=Fv,n+1(v)=...= Fv,¯ n(v) ∀v. (8)
Under the common values hypothesis
Fv,n(v) <F v,n+1(v) <...<F v,¯ n(v) ∀v. (9)
3 Tests for Stochastic Dominance
Corollary 1 suggests that a test for stochastic dominance applied to estimates of each Fv,n(·)
would provide a test for common values. If the values vit = v(xit,x it,n) were directly
observed, a wide variety of existing tests from the statistics and econometrics literature could
be used (e.g, McFadden (1989), Anderson (1996), Davidson and Duclos (2000), Barrett and










1(vit ≤ y,nt = n).9
is commonly used to form test statistics.
Our testing problem has the complication that each vit is not directly observed but










1(ˆ vit ≤ y,nt = n).
Several diﬃculties are involved in formulating consistent tests based on these empirical
distributions and the testing principle above, and in deriving the large sample properties
o ft h et e s ts t a t i s t i c s . T h ep r i m a r yd i ﬃculty is the dependence of the asymptotic distri-
butions of test statistics on the ﬁrst-step nonparametric estimation of pseudo-values. This
not only adds estimation error but also introduces ﬁnite sample dependence between nearby
pseudo-value estimates that must be accounted for in the asymptotic theory. A further com-
plication is trimming, which is needed at the boundaries of the supports of the pseudo-value
distributions, because nonparametric density estimates appear in (7). Trimming introduces
theoretical diﬃculties that can depend on conditions that are hard to interpret in prac-
tice (see, for example, Lavergne and Vuong (1996)), and naive trimming rules can lead
to inconsistent tests. Finally, note that the validity of inference based on the bootstrap
or subsampling also relies on knowledge of convergence rates and asymptotic distributions
of test statistics, so the diﬃculties in deriving asymptotic distributions cannot be avoided
simply by employing resampling methods.
We consider two approaches that enable us to overcome these diﬃculties. The ﬁrst
involves testing the implications of stochastic dominance for ﬁnite sets of functionals of
each Fv,n(·). This approach enables us to apply multivariate one-sided hypothesis tests
based on tractable asymptotic approximations. The second approach uses a generalized
version of familiar Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, with critical values approximated by
subsampling.
3.1 Multivariate One-Sided Hypothesis Tests for Stochastic Dominance
Let γn denote a ﬁnite vector of monotonic functionals of the distribution Fv,n(·). We will
consider tests of hypotheses of the form
H0 (PV) : γn = γn+1 = ···= γ¯ n
H1 (CV) : γn >γ n+1 > ···>γ ¯ n10




H0 (PV) : δ = 0
H1 (CV) : δ>0.
(10)
We consider two types of functionals γn.7 The ﬁrst is a vector of quantiles of Fv,n(·).
The second is the mean. In the next two subsections we show that for both cases we can
construct consistent estimators of each γn (or the diﬀerence vector δ)w i t hm u l t i v a r i a t e
normal asymptotic distributions. These results rely on the following assumptions.
Assumption 5 1. Each Gn (b;b) is R +1times diﬀerentiable in its ﬁr s ta r g u m e n ta n d
R times diﬀerentiable in its second argument. Each gn (b;b) is R times diﬀerentiable
in both arguments. The derivatives are bounded and continuous.
2.
R
K ( )d  =1and
R
 rK ( )d  =0for all r<R .
R
| |RK ( )d  < ∞.
3. hG = hg = h.A sT →∞ , h −→ 0, Th2ÁlogT −→ ∞, Th2+2R −→ 0.
3.1.1 Tests based on Quantiles
Let ˆ bτ,n denote the τth quantile of the empirical distribution of bids from all n-bidder
auctions, i.e.,
ˆ bτ,n = ˆ G−1
n (τ) ≡ inf{b : ˆ Gn (b) ≥ τ}





i=1 1(bit ≤ b,nt = n). Similarly, let bτ,n denote the τthe quan-
tile of the marginal distribution of bids, Gn(·), while xτ denotes the τth quantile of the
marginal distribution Fx(·) of a bidder’s signal. Equation (4) and monotonicity of the
equilibrium bid function imply that vτ,n,t h eτth quantile of Fv,n(·), can be estimated by
ˆ vτ,n = ˆ bτ,n +
ˆ Gn(ˆ bτ,n;ˆ bτ,n)
ˆ gn(ˆ bτ,n;ˆ bτ,n)
.
Because sample quantiles of the bid distribution converge to population quantiles at rate
√
Tn, the sampling variance of ˆ vτ,n − v(xτ,x τ,n) will be governed by the slow pointwise
nonparametric convergence rate of ˆ gn (·;·).8 As shown in GPV, for ﬁxed b,ˆ gn (b;b)c o n v e r g e s
7Because each null hypothesis we consider consists of a single point in the space of the “parameter” δ,
the diﬃculties discussed in Wolak (1991) do not arise here.
8Note that Gn (b;b) is estimated more precisely than gn (b;b) for all bandwidth sequences h. For simplicity,
in Assumption 5 we have chosen hG = hg, in which case the sampling variance will be dominated by that
from estimation of gn (b;b). We have assumed undersmoothing rather than optimal smoothing to avoid
estimating the asymptotic bias term for inference purposes. An alternative is to choose diﬀerent sequences
for hG and hg.I fw eh a v ec h o s e nhG and hg close to their optimal range, the sampling variance will still be
dominated by that of ˆ gn (b;b) and the result of the theorem will not change. On the other hand if hG ≈ h
2
g
so that ˆ Gn (b;b)a n dˆ gn (b;b) share the same magnitude of variance, then the convergence rate for Gn (b;b)




g to gn (b;b). Theorem 2 then describes the limiting behavior of each ˆ vτ,n.
The proof is given in the appendix.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumption 5 holds. Then as Tn −→ ∞ for each n,




















































converges in distribution to Z ∼ N(0,Ω),w h e r eΩ is a













3.1.2 Tests based on Means













1(nt = n)ˆ vit. (11)
By Corollary 1, Ex[v(x,x,n)] is the same for all n under private values but strictly decreasing
in n with common values.
A complication in implementing a test is the need for a practical way of trimming bound-
ary values of ˆ vit that preserves the interpretation of the null and alternative hypotheses. We
use a trimming rule that equalizes the quantiles trimmed from Fˆ v,n(·)a c r o s sa l ln. Because
equilibrium bid functions are strictly monotone, the pseudo-value at the τth quantile of
Fv,n(·) is that of the bidder with signal at the τth quantile of Fx(·). Hence, trimming bids12
at the same quantile for all values of n also trims the same bidder types (signals) from all
distributions, thereby preserving the consistency of a test based on Corollary 1.
To make this precise, let ˆ bτ,n denote the τth quantile of ˆ Gn(·) and recall that xτ is the
τth quantile of the marginal distribution of a bidder’s signal. The quantile-trimmed mean
is then deﬁned as











ˆ bτ,n ≤ bit ≤ ˆ b1−τ,n,n t = n
´
.
We can then test the modiﬁed hypotheses
H0 : µn,τ = ···= µ¯ n,τ (12)
H1 : µn,τ > ···>µ ¯ n,τ (13)
which are implied by (8) and (9), respectively. The next theorem shows the consistency
and asymptotic normality of each ˆ µn,τ.
Theorem 3 Suppose Assumption 5 holds,
(logT)2






Tnh(ˆ µn,τ − µn,τ)

























The proof is given in the appendix. Note that the convergence rate of each ˆ µn is
√
Tnh.
While this is slower than the parametric rate
√
Tn, it is faster than the
√
Tnh2 rate obtained
for the quantile diﬀerences described above. Intuitively, the intermediate
√
Tnh rate of
convergence arises because although ˆ gn (b;b) is an estimated bivariate density function, in
constructing the estimate ˆ µn we average along the diagonal B∗
it = Bit.9
9While the test based on averaged pseudo-values converges faster than that based on a vector of quantiles,
the improvement of the convergence rate is not proportional because the conditions on bandwidths for
the partial mean case can be diﬀerent from those on the pointwise estimates. However, there are still
improvements after taking this into account, and this advantage of the means-based test is evident in
(unreported) Monte Carlo simulations.13
3.1.3 Test Statistics
In this section we focus on a test for diﬀerences in the means of the pseudo-value distribu-
tions. An analogous test can be constructed using quantiles; however, because of the faster
rate of convergence of the means test and its superior performance in Monte Carlo simula-
tions, we focus on this approach. A likelihood ratio (LR) test (e.g., Bartholomew (1959),
Wolak (1989)) or the weighted power test of Andrews (1998) provide possible approaches
for formulating test statistics based on the asymptotic normality results above. Because we
do not have a good a prior choice of the weighting function for Andrews’ weighted power
test, we have chosen to use the LR test.10
Let σn denote the asymptotic variance given in (14) for each value of n = n,...,¯ n and
deﬁne an ≡ Tn h
σn . Then the asymptotic covariance matrix of the vector
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The restricted maximum-likelihood estimate of the (quantile-trimmed) mean pseudo-value
under the null hypothesis (12) is given by
¯ µ =
P¯ n




To test against the alternative (13), let µ∗
n,...,µ ∗





an (ˆ µn,τ − µn)
2 s.t. µn ≥ µn+1 ≥ ···≥ µ¯ n. (15)
This solution can be found using the well-known “pool adjacent violators” algorithm (Ayer,







n,τ − ¯ µ
¢2 .
The following corollary states that, under the null hypothesis, the LR statistic ¯ χ2 is asymp-
totically distributed as a mixture of Chi-square random variables. The proof is given in
Bartholomew (1959, Section 3).
10Indeed, Monte Carlo results in Andrews (1998) comparing the LR test to his more general tests for
multivariate one-sided hypotheses, which are optimal in terms of a “weighted average power,” suggests that
the LR tests are “close to being optimal for a wide range of [average power] weighting functions” (pg. 158).14
Corollary 2 Under the null PV hypothesis,
Pr
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j denotes a standard Chi-square distribution with j degrees of freedom, and each
mixing weight w(k;Σ) is the probability that the solution to (15) has exactly k distinct
values when the vector {ˆ µn,τ,...,ˆ µ¯ n,τ} has a multivariate N(0,Σ) distribution.
In practice the weights w(k;Σ) can be obtained by simulation from the MVN(0, ˆ Σ)
distribution, where ˆ Σ is a diagonal matrix with elements obtained from sample analogs of
(14). An alternative to using equation (14), explored below, is to estimate each element of
Σ using bootstrap distributions of mean pseudo-values.
3.2 A Sup-Norm Test
A second testing approach is based on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov-type (KS) statistic for a
k-sample test of equal distributions against an alternative of strict ﬁrst-order stochastic








ˆ Fˆ v,n+1(v) − ˆ Fˆ v,n(v)
o
(16)
where [v, ¯ v] is a compact interval strictly bounded away from the boundaries of the support
of the pseudo-value distribution for all n.
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where ψ (·) is a smooth distribution function with bounded support and h0 is a bandwidth
parameter, then ¯ δT provides a smooth approximation to the KS statistic in (16), with
limh0→0 ¯ δT = δT. We will work with this generalized statistic.
Strict monotonicity of Λ(·) and uniform consistency of each estimate of EnΛ(vit −v)o n
the compact set v ∈ [v,¯ v]i m p l yt h a t¯ δT → 0a sT →∞under H0,w h i l e¯ δT → ∆ > 0 under15
H1. This forms a basis for testing. In particular, deﬁne the test statistic
ST = ηT¯ δT
where ηT is a normalizing sequence proportional to (Th)
1/2. Appendix C describes the
large sample behavior of this test statistic. In particular, we show there that ST has a
nondegenerate limiting distribution.
To approximate the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic, we use a subsampling
approach.11 Recall that the observables consist of the set of bids Bt =( B1t,...,B ntt)f r o m
each auction t =1 ,...,T.S o w e c a n w r i t e





Let RT denote a sequence of subsample sizes and, for each n,l e tRnT be a sequence pro-















of (B1,...B T) consisting of all bids








obtained using the ith such subsample of bids. The sampling








ηRT ¯ δT,RT,i ≤ x
¢
. (17)
The critical value for a test at level α is taken to be the 1 − α quantile, Φ1−α
T,RT,o fΦT,RT.
Theorem 4 (i) Let RT →∞and RT







(ii) Assume that as T →∞ , RT →∞ , RT






→ 1 as T →∞ .
The proof is omitted because the result follows from Theorem 2.6.1 of Politis, Romano,
and Wolf (1999), given the discussion above and the results in Appendix C. As usual, in
practice the empirical distribution in (17) is approximated using random subsampling.
11See Linton, Massoumi, and Whang (2002) for a recent application of subsampling to tests for stochastic
dominance in a diﬀerent context.16
4M o n t e C a r l o S i m u l a t i o n s
Here we summarize the results of Monte Carlo experiments performed to evaluate our testing
approaches. We examine the performance of our tests on data generated by two PV models
and two CV models:
(PV1) independent private values, xi ∼ u[0,1];
(PV2) independent private values, lnxi ∼ N(0,1);





(CV2) pure common values, ui = u ∼ u[0,1], conditionally independent signals xi uniform
on [0,u].13
Before reporting the results, we turn to Figure 1. Here we illustrate the empirical
distributions of pseudo-values obtained by applying the ﬁrst-stage nonparametric estimators
using one simulated data set from each of the four models. We do this for n =2 ,...,5,
with Tn = 200. For the PV models, the estimated distributions are very close to each
other. For the CV models these distributions clearly suggest the ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance relation implied by the winner’s curse. Note that in both model CV1 and
model CV2, the eﬀect of a change in n on the distribution appears to be largest when
n is small. This is the case in many CV models and is quite intuitive: the diﬀerence
between E[U1|X1 =m a x j∈{2,...,n} Xj = x]a n dE[U1|X1 =m a x j∈{2,...,n+1} Xj = x] typically
shrinks as n grows. This is important because most auction data sets contain relatively few
observations for n large but many observations for n small–exactly where the eﬀects of the
winner’s curse are most pronounced.
We ﬁrst consider the LR test based on quantile-trimmed means. Tables 1 and 2 summa-
rize the test results, using tests with nominal size 5% and 10%. The last two rows in Table 1
indicate that in the PV models there is a tendency to over-reject when sample analogs of
(14) are used to construct the mixing weights in Corollary 2. For example, for tests with
nominal size 10% and data generated by the PV1 model, we reject 20.5% of the time when
the range of bidders is 2—4, and 39% of the time when the range of bidders is 2—5. The tests
do appear to have good power properties, rejecting the CV models in 70 to 100 percent of
the replications. However, the over-rejection under the null is a concern.
12Here v(x,x;n)=
3n−2
4(n−1)x, leading to the equilibrium bid function sn(x)=
3n−2
4n x.I ti se a s yt os e et h a t
although v(x,x;n)is strictly decreasing in n, sn(x)s t r i c t l yi n c r e a s e si nn.
13The symmetric equilibrium bid function for this model is given in Matthews (1984).17
One possible reason for the over-rejections is that the asymptotic approximations of the
variances of the average pseudo-values derived in Theorem 3 may be poor at the modest
sample sizes we consider. We have considered an alternative of using bootstrap estimates of
the elements of Σ.14 We use a block bootstrap procedure that repeatedly selects an auction
from the original sample at random and includes all bids from that auction in the bootstrap
sample, thereby preserving any dependence between bids within each auction. The results,
reported in Table 2, indicate that the tendency towards over-rejection is attenuated when
we estimate these variances with the bootstrap. For a test with nominal size 10%, we now
reject no more than 14% of the time when the range of n is 2—4, and 18% of the time when
the range of n is 2—5. With a 5% nominal size, our rejection rates range between 4% and
12%. The power properties remain very good. These results are encouraging and suggest
use of the bootstrap in practice.




with smoothing parameter h0 =0 .01.15 This test appears to perform extremely well. The
rejection rates for the two PV models are very close to the nominal sizes in all cases, and
the rejection rates for the CV models are extremely high.
5 Endogenous Participation
Thus far we have assumed that variation in bidder participation across auctions is exoge-
nous to the joint distribution of bidders’ valuations and signals. Such exogenous variation
could arise, for example, from shocks to bidders’ costs of participation, variation in bidder
populations across markets, or seller restrictions on participation–e.g., in government auc-
tions (McAfee and McMillan (1987)) or ﬁeld experiments (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, List, and
Lucking-Reiley (1999)). However, in many applications participation may be endogenous.
Here we explore adaptation of our testing approach to such situations, considering several
diﬀerent models of participation.
14Note that we are not bootstrapping the distribution of the test statistic given in Corollary 2, only the
component Σ. Bootstrapping the distribution of the test statistic would require resampling bids under the
null hypothesis on the latent values v(x,x,n).
15We have incorporated the recentering approach suggested by Chernozhukov (2002) whereby, in each
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5.1 Binding Reserve Prices
The most common model of endogenous participation is one in which the seller uses a
binding reserve price r, so that only bidders with suﬃciently favorable signals bid. We
continue to let N denote the number of potential bidders and will now let A denote the
number of actual bidders–those submitting bids of at least r. Variation in the number
of potential bidders is still taken to be exogenous; i.e., Assumption 4 is maintained in this
case. However, A will be determined endogenously. Because we consider sealed bid auctions
with private information, it is natural to assume bidders know the realization of N but not
that of A when choosing their bids, because A is determined by the realizations of the
signals.16 We still assume the researcher can observe N.17 As before, we let Fv,n(·)d e n o t e
the distribution of the values v(X,X,n)o ft h en potential bidders.
As shown by Milgrom and Weber (1982), given r and n, a bidder participates if and only












That is, a bidder participates only if he would be willing to pay the reserve price for the
good even when no other bidder were. In a PV auction, we may assume without loss of
generality that E[Ui|Xi = x]=x. Because E [Ui|Xi = x,maxj6=i Xj ≤ x]=E[Ui|Xi = x]
in a PV model, equation (18) gives x∗(r,n)=r. In a common values model, however,
E [Ui|Xi = x,maxj6=i Xj ≤ x]d e c r e a s e si nn (the proof follows that of Theorem 1), implying
that x∗(r,n)i n c r e a s e si nn. This gives the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The screening level x∗(r,n) is invariant to n in a PV model but strictly increas-
ing in n in a CV model.
This result implies that our baseline testing approach must be modiﬁed to account for
the selection introduced by endogenous participation. For both PV and CV models, the
equilibrium participation rule implies that the marginal distribution of the signals of actual
bidders is the truncated distribution
Fx(x|r,n)=
Fx(x) − Fx(x∗(r,n))
1 − Fx(x∗(r, n))
.
16Schneyerov (2002) considers a diﬀerent model in which bidders observe a signal of the number of actual
bidders after the participation decision but before bids are made.
17See HPP for an example. If this is not the case, not only is testing diﬃcult, but the more fundamental
identiﬁcation of bidders’ values v(x,x,n) generally fails. This is because bidding is based on a ﬁrst-order
condition for bidders who condition on the realization of N when constructing their beliefs Gn(b|b) regarding
the most competitive opposing bid. In general, identiﬁc a t i o nb a s e do naﬁrst-order condition requires that
the researcher condition on the same information available to bidders.19
Hence, letting
v∗(r,n)=v(x∗ (r,n),x ∗ (r,n),n)





∀v ≥ v∗(r,n). (19)
In a PV model, Fx(x|r,n)=
Fx(x)−Fx(r)
1−Fx(r) . Because neither this distribution nor the
expectation v(x,x,n)v a r i e sw i t hn in a PV model, it is still the case that the distribution
Fv,n(·)i si n v a r i a n tt on in a PV model, implying that FA
v,n(·) is too. However, the CV
case does not give a clean prediction about FA
v,n(·). Because x∗(r,n) increases with n under
common values, changes in n aﬀect the marginal distribution of actual bidders’ values in
two ways: ﬁrst by the fact that v(x,x,n)d e c r e a s e si nn for ﬁxed x; second by the fact that
as n increases, only higher values of x are in the sample. The ﬁrst eﬀect creates a tendency
toward the FOSD relation derived in Theorem 1 for CV models, while the second eﬀect
works in the opposite direction. This leaves the eﬀect on FA
v,n(v) of an exogenous change
in n ambiguous in a CV model. However, we can obtain unambiguous testable predictions
under both the PV and CV hypotheses by exploiting the following result.
Lemma 2 With a binding reserve price r, Fv,n(v∗ (r,n)) is identiﬁed for all n.
Proof: Let ˜ Fx,n(·) denote the joint distribution of signals X1,...,X n in an n-bidder auction.
Then
Fv,n(v∗(r,n)) = Fx(x∗(r, n))






Pr(A = n − k|N = n) (20)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from nondegeneracy and the last two follow from exchange-
ability. ¤
With Fv,n(v∗(r,n)) known for each n, we can then reconstruct Fv,n(v) for all v ≥ v∗(r,n).
In particular, from (19) we have
Fv,n(v)=[ 1− Fv,n(v∗ (r,n))]FA
v,n(v)+Fv,n(v∗ (r,n)) ∀v ≥ v∗(r,n). (21)
With this we can give the main result of this section.
Theorem 5 Fv,n(v) is identiﬁed for all v ≥ v∗(r,n).20
Proof: With a binding reserve price
Gn(b|b)=P r ( A =1 |Bi = b,N = n)+
n X
j=2
Pr(A = j, max
k∈{1,2,...,j}\i
Bk ≤ b|Bi = b,N = n).
Hence, the observables and the ﬁrst-order condition (4) uniquely determine v(s−1
n (b),s −1
n (b),n)
for all n and b ≥ sn(x∗(r,n)). This determines the distribution FA
v,n(·). Lemma 2 and equa-
tion (21) then give the result. ¤
Testable implications of the PV and CV models for the distribution Fv,n(v)w e r ee s t a b -
lished in Corollary 1, and estimation is easily adapted from that for the baseline case using
sample analogs of the probabilities in the identiﬁcation results above.18 However, note that
we cannot compare the distributions Fv,n(v) in their (truncated) left tails, but rather only
in the regions of common support of the distributions FA
v,n(·). In particular, because x∗(r,n)
is nondecreasing in n we can test19
H0 : Fv,n(v)=Fv,3(v)=···= Fv,¯ n(v) ∀v ≥ v∗(r, ¯ n) (22)
against
H1 : Fv,n(v) <F v,3(v) < ···<F v,¯ n(v) ∀v ≥ v∗(r, ¯ n) (23)
which are implied by (8) and (9), respectively.20
While this provides an approach for consistent testing, the fact that we must restrict
the region of comparison could be a limitation in ﬁnite samples, particularly if the true
model is one in which the eﬀects of the winner’s curse are most pronounced for bidders with
signals in the left tail of the distribution. However, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between v∗(r, ¯ n)
and v∗(r,n)f o rn<¯ n (the reason a test of (22) vs. (23) would involve a substantially
restricted support) is itself evidence inconsistent with the PV hypothesis but implied by
the CV hypothesis. Hence, a complementary testing approach is available based on the
following theorem.
Theorem 6 Under the PV hypothesis, Fv,n(v∗(r,n)) is identical for all n.U n d e rt h eC V
hypothesis, Fv,n(v∗(r,n)) is strictly increasing in n.
18The deﬁnitions of ˆ Gn(b;b)a n dˆ gn(b;b)would require the obvious modiﬁcations to account for the fact
that only a bids, not n, are observed in each auction with n potential bidders.
19Each v
∗(r, n)i sj u s tt h el o w e s tv a l u eo fv(x,x,n) for an actual bidder and is therefore easily estimated
from the pseudo-values.
20We have assumed here that r is ﬁxed across auctions. This is not necessary. For example, if r is the
largest reserve price used, the approach here would enable identiﬁcation of Fv,n(v) for all v>v
∗(r,n).
Furthermore, as GPV have suggested, variation in r can enable one to trace out more of the distribution
Fv,n(·) by extending methods from the statistics literature on random truncation. A full development of
this extension is a topic unto itself and not pursued here.21
Proof: Because Fv,n(v∗(r,n)) = F (x∗(r,n)), the result follows from Lemma 1. ¤
Consistent estimation of Fv,n(v∗(r,n)) for each n is easily accomplished with sample
analogs of the probabilities on the right-hand side of (20). A multivariate one-sided hy-
pothesis test similar to those developed above could then be applied.
5.2 Costly Participation
Endogenous participation also arises when it is costly for bidders to participate. In some
applications preparing a bid may be time consuming. In others, learning the signal Xi
might require estimating costs based on detailed contract speciﬁcations, soliciting bids from
subcontractors, or exploratory work. Because bidders must recover participation costs on
average, for N large enough it is not an equilibrium for all bidders to participate, even if
all are certain to place a value on the good strictly above the reserve price (if any). We
consider two standard models of costly participation from the theoretical literature.
5.2.1 Bid Preparation Costs
Samuelson (1985) studied a model in which bidders ﬁrst observe their signals and the reserve
price r, then decide whether to incur a cost c of preparing a bid. Samuelson considered
only the independent private values model; however, for our purposes this model of costly
participation is equivalent to one in which the seller charges a participation fee c (a bidder’s
participation decision and ﬁrst-order condition are the same regardless of whether the fee is
paid to the seller, to an outside party, or simply “burned”). The case of a participation fee
paid to the seller has been treated by Milgrom and Weber (1982) for their general aﬃliated
values model. We will assume that their “regular case” (pp. 1112—1113) obtains.
Given r and n, participation is again determined by the realization of signals and a
screening level





[v(x,y,n) − r]dFn(y|x)] ≥ c
¾
.
Unlike the model in the preceding section, this screening level varies with n even with private
values, because Fn (x|x)v a r i e sw i t hn. However, a valid testing approach can nonetheless
be developed in a manner nearly identical to that in the preceding section. In particular,
the argument used to prove Lemma 2 also implies the following.
Lemma 3 With a reserve price r and bid preparation cost c, Fv,n(v(x∗ (r,c,n),x ∗ (r,c,n),n))
is identiﬁed from observation of A and N.22
Letting v∗(r,n) now denote v(x∗ (r,c,n),x ∗ (r,c,n),n), the ﬁrst-order condition (4) and
equation (21) can then be used to construct consistent estimates of Fv,n(v) for all v ≥
v∗(r, ¯ n), enabling testing of the hypotheses (22) vs. (23) as in the preceding section.
5.2.2 Signal Acquisition Costs
As o m e w h a td i ﬀerent model is considered by Levin and Smith (1994).21 In their model,
each bidder chooses whether to incur cost c in order to learn (or to process) his signal Xi and
submit a bid. Bidders know N and observe the number of actual bidders before they bid.
In the symmetric equilibrium, each potential bidder’s participation decision is a binomial
randomization. With no reserve price, this leads to exogenous variation in A. Because A
is observed by bidders prior to bidding in their model, our analysis for the baseline case of
exogenous variation in N then carries through directly, substituting A for N.22
5.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity
The last model of endogenous participation we consider is the most challenging. Here
participation is determined in part by unobserved factors that also aﬀect the distribution
of bidders’ valuations. There are really two problems that arise in such an environment.
First, it is clear that if auctions with large numbers of bidders tend to be those in which
the good is known by bidders to be of particularly high (or low) value, tests based on
an assumption that variation in participation is exogenous can give misleading results.
Second, unobserved heterogeneity in ﬁrst-price auctions introduces serious challenges to
the nonparametric identiﬁcation of bidders’ valuations that underlies our approach (recall
footnote 17).23 Here we describe a structure under which both problems can be overcome,
using instrumental variables.
Suppose that the number of actual bidders, A, at each auction can be represented as a
function of two factors, Z and W. Z is an index capturing the eﬀects of factors observable
both to bidders and to the researcher. W summarizes the eﬀects factors observable only to
21Li (2002) has considered parametric estimation of the symmetric IPV model for ﬁrst-price auctions
under this entry model.
22If, in addition, there were a binding reserve price, only bidders who paid the signal acquisition cost and
observed suﬃciently high signals would participate. The mixed strategies determining signal acquisition,
however, still result in exogenous variation in the number of “informed bidders,” I,as u b s e tA of whom
would obtain suﬃciently high signals to bid. In this case testing would be possible following the approach
in section 5.1, but with I replacing N.
23Krasnokutskaya (2003) has recently shown that methods from the literature on measurement error can
be used to enable estimation of a particular private values model in which unobserved heterogeneity enters
multiplicatively (or additively) and is independent of the idiosyncratic components (themselves indepen-
dently distributed) of bidders’ values.23
bidders. We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 6 Z ∈ R is independent of (U1,...,U¯ n,X 1,...,X¯ n,W).
Assumption 7 A = φ(Z,W),w i t hφ increasing in Z and strictly increasing in W.
Assumption 6 allows the possibility that the unobserved factor W is correlated with
(U1,...,U¯ n,X 1,...,X¯ n), but requires that Z not be. We will see in the following section
that observables aﬀecting the distribution of valuations can be controlled for directly. Hence,
the availability of Z satisfying Assumption 6 is a standard exclusion restriction, and we will
refer to Z as the instrument. Changes in Z will provide exogenous variation in the level of
competition that is essential to our ability to detect the winner’s curse. Note that in some
applications Z might simply be the number of potential bidders, N. However, it need not
be. For example, we might have
A = υ(ζ)+W
where Z = υ(ζ) is a function (possibly unknown) of a vector of instrumental variables ζ.
In Assumption 7, monotonicity of φ(·)i nZ is the requirement that the instrument be
positively correlated with the endogenous variable A. Weak monotonicity of φ(·)i nt h e
unobservable W would be a normalization of W and could be assumed without loss. The
strict monotonicity assumed here is a restriction implying that (A,Z)a r ej o i n ts u ﬃcient
statistics for W; in particular
˜ Fn(U1,...,U n,X 1,...,X n|A,Z,W)= ˜ Fn(U1,...,U n,X 1,...,X n|A,Z).24





Ui|Xi =m a x
j6=i




Ga,z(b∗|b)=P r ( m a x
j6=i
Bj ≤ b∗|Bi = b,A = a,Z = z)
24If the relationship between A and W were only weakly monotone, conditioning on (A,Z)w o u l db e
equivalent to conditioning on (A,Z)a n dt h ee v e n tW ∈ W for some set W.I ns o m ea p p l i c a t i o n st h i sm a y
be suﬃcient to enable the use of the ﬁrst-order condition (4) as a useful approximation.
25This idea is related to that taken in a very diﬀerent problem by Olley and Pakes (1996).24
and denote the corresponding conditional density by ga,z(b∗|b). When bidders observe both
Z and W before choosing their bids, the suﬃcient statistic property implies that equilibrium





Analogous to the baseline case, this ﬁrst-order condition enables consistent estimation of
each v(xi,x i;a,z), using straightforward modiﬁcations of the nonparametric estimators de-
scribed above.
Now observe that





U1|X1 =m a x
j∈{2,...,φ(z,W)}














where the ﬁnal equality follows from Assumption 6. Assumption 7 and the proof of Theorem
1 imply that the ﬁnal expression above is increasing in z in a CV auction but invariant to
z in a PV auction. Hence our testing approaches are still applicable if we exploit the
exogenous variation in the instrument Z rather than variation in N or A. In particular,
after estimating pseudo-values using equation (25), one can pool pseudo-values over all
values of a while holding z ﬁxed to compare the sample analogs of the distributions in (26)
across values of z. We emphasize that while the comparison of distributions of pseudo-
values forming the test is done pooling over a,t h eﬁrst-stage estimation of pseudo-values
using (25) must be done conditioning on both a and z.
6 Observable Heterogeneity
For simplicity we have thus far assumed that data were available from auctions of iden-
tical goods. In practice this is rarely the case. In our application below, as in many
others, we observe auction-speciﬁc characteristics that are likely to shift the distribution
of bidder valuations. The results above can be extended to incorporate observables us-
ing standard nonparametric techniques. Let Y be a vector of observables and deﬁne





gn(b|b) on the right-hand side of the ﬁrst-order condition (4) and
v(x,x,n,y) ≡ E[Ui|Xi =m a x
j6=i
Xj = x,Y = y]25
on the left-hand side. Standard smoothing techniques can be used to estimate
Gn,y(b|b)
gn,y(b|b) ,i n
principle enabling one to apply our testing approaches. With many covariates, however,
estimation of the pseudo-values using smoothing techniques will require large data sets.
An alternative is available if we are willing to assume
v(x,x,n,y)=v(x,x,n)+Γ(y) (27)
with Y independent of X1,...,X n. This additively separable structure is particularly useful
because it is preserved by equilibrium bidding.26
Lemma 4 Suppose that Y is independent of X and (27) holds. Then the equilibrium bid
function, conditional on Y = y, has the additively separable form s(x;n,y)=s(x;n)+Γ(y).
The proof follows the standard equilibrium derivation for a ﬁrst-price auction (only the
boundary condition for the diﬀerential equation (1) changes) and is therefore omitted. An
important implication of this result is that we can account for observable heterogeneity in a
two-stage procedure that avoids the need to condition on (smooth over) Y when estimating




We can then write the equilibrium bidding strategy as
s(x;n,y)=s0(n)+Γ0 + Γ1(y)+s1(x;n)
where the stochastic term s1(x;n) has mean zero conditional on (n,y). Now observe that
βit ≡ s0(nt)+Γ0 + s1(xit;nt) (28)
is the bid that bidder i would have submitted in equilibrium in a generic (i.e., Γ1(y)=0 )
n-bidder auction. Hence, given estimates ˆ Γ1(y)o fe a c hΓ1(y), we can construct estimates
ˆ βit = bit−ˆ Γ1(y)o fe a c hβit. Our tests can then be applied using these “homogenized” bids.
To implement this approach, we ﬁrst regress all observed bids on the covariates Y and a
set of dummy variables for each value of n. The sum of each residual and the corresponding
intercept estimate provides an estimate of each βit. These estimates are then treated as bids
26If the covariates enter multiplicatively rather than additively, an analogous approach to that proposed
below can be applied.26
in a sample of auctions of homogeneous goods. Note that the function Γ1(·) is estimated
using all bids in the sample rather than separately for each value of n.T h i s c a n m a k e i t
possible to incorporate a large set of covariates and can make a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of Γ1(·)
feasible. Furthermore, the asymptotic distributions of the ultimate test statistics are not
aﬀected by this procedure as long as ˆ Γ1(y) converges at a faster rate than the pseudo-value
estimates. This is guaranteed, for example, if Γ1(·) is parametrically speciﬁed.
Adapting this approach to the models of endogenous participation discussed above is
straightforward. The case requiring modiﬁcation is that in which instrumental variables
are used. There the intercept of the equilibrium bid functions s(x;a,y,w)w i l ln o wv a r y
with both a and w (or, equivalently, with both a and z). Under the assumptions of section
5.3, one needs only to include in the regressions separate intercepts s0(a,z)+Γ0 (replacing
s0(n)+Γ0 in (28)) for each combination of a and z. The sum of the (a,z)-speciﬁc intercept
and the residuals from the corresponding auctions are then the homogenized bids.
7 Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions
7.1 Data and Background
We apply our tests to auctions held by the United States Forest Service (USFS). In each
sale, a contract for timber harvesting on Federal land was sold by ﬁrst-price sealed bid
auction. Detailed descriptions of the contracts being sold and the auctions themselves can
be found in, e.g., Baldwin (1995), Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997), Athey and Levin
(2001), Haile (2001), or Haile and Tamer (2003). Here we discuss a few key features that
are particularly relevant to our analysis.
We will separately consider two types of Forest Service auctions, for which the signiﬁ-
cance of common value elements may be diﬀerent. The ﬁr s tt y p ei sk n o w na salumpsum
sale. As the term suggests, here each bidder oﬀers a total bid for an entire tract of standing
timber. The winning bidder pays his bid regardless of the volume actually realized at the
time of harvest. Bidders, therefore, may face considerable common uncertainty over the
volume of timber on the tract. More signiﬁcant, individual bidders often conduct a “cruise”
of the tract before the auction, creating a natural source of the private information essen-
tial to the CV model. Before each sale, however, the Forest Service conducts its own cruise
of the tract to provide bidders with estimates of (among other things) timber volumes by
species, harvesting costs, costs of manufacturing end products from the timber, and selling
prices of these end products. This creates a great deal of common knowledge information
about the tract. Whether scope remains for signiﬁcant private information regarding de-27
terminants of tract value common to all bidders is uncertain, although our ap r i o r ibelief
was that lumpsum sales were likely possess common value elements.
The second type of auction is known as a “scaled sale.” Here, bids are made on a per
unit (thousand board-feet of timber) basis. The winner is selected based on these unit
prices and the ex ante estimates of timber volumes obtained from the Forest Service cruise.
However, payments to the Forest Service are based on the winning bidder’s unit prices
and the actual volumes, measured by a third party at the time of harvest. As a result,
the importance of common uncertainty regarding tract values may be reduced. In fact,
bidders are less likely to send their own cruisers to assess the tract value for a scaled sale
(National Resources Management Corporation (1997)). This may leave less scope for private
information regarding any shared determinants of bidders’ valuations and, therefore, less
scope for common values. Bidders may still have private information of an idiosyncratic
nature, e.g., regarding their own sales and inventories of end products, contracts for future
sales, or inventories of uncut timber from private timber sales. This has led several authors
(e.g., Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997), Haile (2001), Haile and Tamer (2003)) to
assume a private values model for scaled sales.27 However, this is not without controversy;
Baldwin (1995) and Athey and Levin (2001) argue for a common values model even for
scaled sales.28
The auctions in our samples took place between 1982 and 1990 in Forest Service regions 1
and 5. Region 1 covers Montana, eastern Washington, Northern Idaho, North Dakota, and
northwestern South Dakota. The Region 5 data consist of sales in California. The restriction
to sales after 1981 is made due to policy changes in 1981 that (among other things) reduced
the signiﬁcance of subcontracting as a factor aﬀecting bidder valuations, because resale
opportunities can alter bidding in ways that confound the empirical implications of the
winner’s curse (cf. Bikhchandani and Huang (1989), Haile (1999), and Haile (2001)). For
the same reason, we restrict attention to sales with no more than 12 months between the
auction and the harvest deadline.29 For consistency, we consider only sales in which the
Forest Service provided ex ante estimates of the tract values (based on the cruise) using
the predominant method of this time period, known as the “residual value method” (cf.
Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997)). We exclude salvage sales, sales set aside for small
27Other studies assuming private values at timber auctions (USFS and others) include Cummins (1994),
Elyakime, Laﬀont, Loisel, and Vuong (1994), Hansen (1985), Hansen (1986), Johnson (1979), Paarsch (1991),
and Paarsch (1997).
28Other studies assuming common values models for Forest Service timber auctions include Chatterjee
and Harrison (1988), Lederer (1994), and Leﬄer, Rucker, and Munn (1994).
29This is the same rule used by Haile and Tamer (2003) and the opposite of that used by Haile (2001) to
focus on sales with signiﬁcant resale opportunities.28
ﬁrms, and sales of contracts requiring the winner to construct roads.
Table 4 describes the resulting sample sizes for auctions with each number of bidders
n =2 ,3,...,12. There are fairly few auctions with more than four bidders, particularly in
the sample of lumpsum sales. However, the unit of observation, both for estimation of the
pseudo-values and for estimation of the distribution of pseudo-values, is a bid. Our data
set contains 75 or more bids for auctions of up to seven bidders in both samples.
Our data include all bids30 for each auction, as well as a large number of auction-speciﬁc
observables. These include the year of the sale, the appraised value of the tract, the acreage
of the tract, the length (in months) of the contract term, the volume of timber sold by the
USFS in the same region over the previous six months, and USFS estimates of the volume
of timber on the tract, harvesting costs, costs of manufacturing end products, selling value
of the end products, and an index of the concentration of the timber volume across species
(cf. Haile (2001)). All dollar values are in constant 1983 dollars per thousand board-feet of
timber. Table 5 provides summary statistics.
7.2 Results
We ﬁrst perform our tests on each sample under the assumption of exogenous participation.
We consider comparisons of auctions with up to 7 bidders, although we look at ranges
of 2—3, 2—4, 2—5, and 2—6 bidders as well. We use the method described in section 6 to
eliminate the eﬀects of observable heterogeneity with an initial linear regression of bids on
the covariates listed above. Figures 2 and 3 show the estimated distributions of pseudo-
values for each of these comparisons. The distributions compared appear to be roughly
similar, although there is certainly some variation. Table 6 reports the formal test results,
where we set the number of resampling draws at 5000 for both types of tests. For each
speciﬁcation we report the R2 from the regressions of bids on auction covariates, the means
of each estimated distribution of pseudo-values, and the p-value associated with each test
of the private values null hypothesis.
The ﬁt of the bid regressions are generally very good (recall that bids are already nor-
malized by the size of the tract), leaving plausible residual variation to be attributed to
bidders’ private information. The formal tests provide little evidence of common values.
For the scaled sales, only one of the ten test statistics suggests rejection of the PV null at
the 10 percent level. For the lumpsum sales, the p-values are generally smaller; however,
30In practice separate prices are bid for each identiﬁed species on the tract. Following, e.g., Baldwin,
Marshall, and Richard (1997), Haile (2001), and Haile and Tamer (2003), we consider only the total bid of
each bidder, which is also the statistic used to determine the auction winner. See Athey and Levin (2001)
for an analysis of the distribution of bids across species.29
only two of ten tests indicate rejection at a 10 percent level. Only in the sample of auctions
with 2—4 bidders do we obtain results suggesting rejection of the PV null from both types
of test.
One possible reason for a failure to reject the null is the presence of unobserved het-
erogeneity correlated with the number of bidders.31 If tracts of higher value in unobserved
dimensions also attracted more bidders, for example, there would be a tendency for the
distributions compared to shift in the direction opposite that predicted by the winner’s
curse. There is some suggestion of this in the graphs. Hence, we also perform the tests
using the model of endogenous participation with unobserved heterogeneity discussed in
section 5.3.32 As instruments, ζ, we use the numbers of sawmills and logging ﬁrms in the
county of each sale and its neighboring counties (cf. Haile (2001)). This approach adds a
second least-squares projection used to estimate Z = υ(ζ)=E[A|ζ]. We then construct a
discrete instrument W by splitting the sample into thirds (halves when we compare only 2-
and 3-bidder auctions) based on the number of predicted bidders.
Figures 4 and 5 show the resulting empirical distributions of pseudo-values compared in
each test. For the scaled sales, the distributions are generally close and exhibit no clear
ordering. For the lumpsum sales the distributions also appear to be fairly similar, although
most comparisons suggest the stochastic ordering predicted by a CV model. The formal
test results are given in Table 7. For the scaled sales we again ﬁnd only one of ten tests
suggesting rejection of the PV null at a 10 percent level. Furthermore, the two samples for
which p-values below 0.15 are obtained are also the two samples for which the two types
of test yield substantially diﬀerent results. An examination of the corresponding graphs
in Figure 4 reveals that these are cases in which the empirical distributions are shifting
with n, but in a nonmonotonic fashion. For the lumpsum sales, three of ten tests yield
p-values below 0.05, and six of ten tests give p-values below 0.20. Among the KS tests,
which appeared to be the best performers in the Monte Carlo experiments, the p-values are
below 0.05 in two of ﬁve cases, and below 0.20 in four of ﬁve cases. However, while this
provides a much stronger suggestion of common values than the tests on the scaled sale
data, the results are clearly mixed.
As a speciﬁcation check, we have examined the relationship between the estimated
pseudo-values and the associated bids. Under the maintained assumption of equilibrium
31Haile (2001) provides some evidence using a diﬀerent sample of USFS auctions.
32We continue to assume the absence of a binding reserve price. See, e.g., Mead, Schniepp, and Watson
(1981), Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997), Haile (2001), Haile and Tamer (2003) for arguments that
Forest Service reserve prices are nonbinding, explanations for why this might be the case, and supporting
evidence.30
bidding in the Milgrom-Weber model, v(s−1
n (b),s −1
n (b),n) must be strictly monotone in b.
While testing this restriction has been suggested by GPV and LPV, we are not aware of
any formal testing approach that is directly applicable. However, this does not appear to
be essential in our case. The importance of a formal test is in giving the appropriate al-
lowance for deviations from strict monotonicity that would arise from sampling error. In
most cases we ﬁnd no deviations from strict monotonicity whatsoever, so that no formal
test could reject. In particular, we have examined the relation between bids and estimated
pseudo-values in each subset of the data examined above. For the case in which no instru-
mental variables are used (so that the samples are divided based on the value of n)w eﬁnd
violations only in the case of lumpsum sales with n = 6, and here only in the right tail.
When instrumental variables are used, the samples are split based on the value of both n
and the instrument, leading to smaller samples and greater sampling error. Nonetheless,
even here there are only a few violations. For scaled sales, violations occur at no more than
2 points (i.e., 2 bids) per subsample, and the magnitudes of the violations are extremely
small–on the order of 0.03 to 0.3 percent of the pseudo-values themselves. The handful of
larger violations for lumpsum sales again occur only when auctions with n =6a r ee x a m -
ined. These subsamples also account for two of three cases in which the means test and KS
test give qualitatively diﬀerent results.
8 Conclusions and Extensions
We have developed nonparametric tests for common values in ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions.
The tests are nonparametric, require observation only of bids, and are consistent against all
common values alternatives within Milgrom and Weber’s (1982) general framework. The
tests perform well in Monte Carlo simulations and can be adapted to incorporate auction-
speciﬁc covariates as well as several models of endogenous participation. In addition to
providing an approach for formal testing, our approach of comparing distributions of pseudo-
values obtained from auctions with diﬀerent numbers of bidders provides one natural way for
quantifying the magnitude of any deviation from a private values model. For example, our
estimates can be used to describe how much bidders adjust their expectations of the value
of winning in response to an exogenous increase in competition (on average, or at various
quantiles, etc.). This provides a natural measure of the severity of the winner’s curse.
Of course, in some applications one would like to address questions like how far wrong a
particular policy prescription would go if a private values model were incorrectly assumed.
Unfortunately, answering such a question will generally require identiﬁcation of the model,
a n ds u c hi d e n t i ﬁcation generally fails without strong functional form assumptions once the31
PV hypothesis is dropped (see, e.g., Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and Athey and Haile
(2002)). Indeed, the lack of nonparametric identiﬁcation of CV models is one motivation
for developing formal tests for common values.
In our application to USFS timber sales, we consistently fail to ﬁnd evidence of common
values at scaled sales. This is consistent with a priori arguments for private values at these
auctions oﬀered in the literature. We obtain mixed evidence against the PV hypothesis for
lumpsum sales, where the a priori case for common values seemed stronger. The estimates
published following the Forest Service cruise may be suﬃciently precise that they leave little
role for private information of a common values nature.33 In fact, the cruises performed by
the Forest Service for lumpsum sales are more thorough than those for scaled sales, a fact
reﬂected in the name “tree measurement sale” given to such sales by the Forest Service.
Hence, the intuitive argument for common values at the lumpsum sales might simply be
misleading. It is, of course, a desire to avoid relying on intuition alone that led us to pursue
a formal testing approach in the ﬁrst place.
However, our tests are not without limitations that should be kept in mind when inter-
preting our empirical results and applying our tests elsewhere. While we have allowed a
rich class of models in our underlying framework, we have maintained the assumption of
equilibrium competitive bidding in a static game, ruling out collusion and dynamic factors
that might inﬂuence bidding decisions. While a veriﬁcation of the monotonicity restriction
our assumptions imply provides some comfort, this speciﬁcation test cannot detect all vi-
olations of these assumptions. Even if these assumptions are satisﬁed, our techniques for
dealing with endogenous participation and auction heterogeneity have required additional
assumptions and ﬁnite sample approximations. Finally, while our tests are consistent, the
eﬀects of the winner’s curse in the USFS auctions may be suﬃciently small that they are
diﬃcult to detect in the moderate sample sizes available. In this case a failure to reject the
PV null (here or elsewhere) should be viewed as evidence that any CV elements are fairly
small relative to other sources of variation in the data.
A further limitation of the approach as we have described it above is an assumption of
symmetry. However, this is not essential. One can extend our methods to detect common
value elements with asymmetric bidders (i.e., dropping the exchangeability assumption) as
long as at least one bidder participates in auctions with diﬀerent numbers of competitors.
A full treatment of this topic is left for future work. However, two basic modiﬁcations of our
approach are required. The ﬁrst is that we must examine one bidder at a time. For example,
33The fact that bidders conduct their own tract cruises does not contradict this, because the information
obtained from private cruises could relate primarily to ﬁrm-speciﬁc (private value) factors.32
a test for the presence of common values for bidder 1 can be based on the distributions of
his values v1(x,x,n), given in equilibrium by the ﬁrst-order condition
v1(x1t,x 1t,n t)=b1t +
∂
∂b Pr(maxj6=1 Bjt ≤ b∗,B 1t ≤ b|Nt = nt)|b=b∗=b1t
∂2
∂b∂b∗ Pr(maxj6=1 Bjt ≤ b∗,B 1t ≤ b|Nt = nt)|b=b∗=b1t
. (29)
The nonparametric estimators described previously are easily adapted to this case, using
the joint distribution of bids from the auctions bidder 1 participates in to estimate the
right-hand side of (29). Under the PV hypothesis, v1(x,x,n) is constant across n.I no r d e r
to obtain a stochastic ordering under the CV alternative, however, we require the second
modiﬁcation: in considering auctions with n =2 ,3,..., we must construct a sequence of
sets of opponents faced by bidder 1 in which the winner’s curse is becoming unambiguously
more severe, e.g., {bidder 2}, {bidder 2, bidder 3}, {bidder 2, bidder 3, bidder 4}, etc.
This structure ensures that the severity of the winner’s curse faced by bidder 1 is greater
in auctions with larger numbers of participants, even though opponents are not perfect
substitutes for each other. While estimation using a long sequence would require a great
deal of data, doing so for a shorter sequence (where the change in the severity of the winner’s
curse is typically largest anyway) may be feasible in some applications.33
Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 2
1. This is a standard result on the
√
Tn-convergence of sample to population quantiles (cf. van der
Vaart (1999), Corollary 21.5).
2. For simplicity we introduce the notation In
t = 1(nt = n), Gn ≡ Gn (b;b), gn ≡ gn (b;b),

































Then we can use a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion to write
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Standard bias calculations for kernel estimators yield, by Assumption 5,
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where C and C0 are constants. Next it will be shown that
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where the last equality uses the substitutions e =(   − b)Áh and e0 =(  0 − b)Áh. Finally the
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−→ 0.
Hence the proof for part 2 is complete.
3. Because the sample quantiles of the bid distribution converge at rate
√
Tn to the population
quantile, which is faster than the convergence rate for the pseudo-values, for large Tn the
sampling error in the τth quantile of the bid distribution does not aﬀect the large sample













































τ = {τ1,...,τ L}




ˆ ξ (sn (xτ);n) − v(xτ,x τ,n)
´
τ = {τ1,...,τ L}.
In part 2 we showed that each element of this vector is asymptotically normal with limit
variance given by the corresponding diagonal element of Ω. It remains to show that the oﬀ-
diagonal elements are 0. For this purpose it suﬃces to show, using the standard result that
kernel estimates at two distinct points (here, two quantiles bτ ≡ s(xτ)a n dbτ0 ≡ s(xτ0)) are
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B Proof of Theorem 3
First note that Assumption 5 directly implies the following uniform rates of convergence for ˆ Gn (b;b)
and ˆ gn (b;b) (see Horowitz (1998) and Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000)).
sup
b∈R
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ˜ Gn (b;b)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≡ sup
b∈R
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ˆ Gn (b;b) − Gn (b;b)










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯˜ gn (b;b)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≡ sup
b∈R
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ˆ gn (b;b) − gn (b;b)









Since part (i) is an immediate consequence of part (ii), we proceed to prove part (ii) directly. Letting
ξ (b;n)=v
¡
s−1 (b),s −1 (b),n
¢
, we can decompose the left side of part (ii) as
p




















ˆ bτ,n ≤ bit ≤ ˆ b1−τ,n
´







where we have again let In




















ˆ bτ,n ≤ bit ≤ ˆ b1−τ,n
´








































ˆ bτ,n ≤ bit ≤ ˆ b1−τ,n
´

















ˆ bτ,n ≤ bit ≤ ˆ b1−τ,n
´
































(ξ (bit;n)1(bτ,n ≤ bit ≤ b1−τ,n) − E [ξ (b;n)1(bτ,n ≤ b ≤ b1−τ,n)])In
t .
W ec o n s i d e rt h ep r o p e r t i e so fe a c ho ft h e s et e r m si nt u r n .F o rˆ µ4




hO p (1) = op (1).
T h ef u n c t i o ni nt h es u m m a n do fˆ µ3
n,τ satisﬁes stochastic equicontinuity conditions (a type I function








ˆ bτ,n ≤ b ≤ ˆ b1−τ,n
´













ˆ b1−τ,n − b1−τ,n
´´








+ op (1) = op (1).
Similarly, the function in the summand of ˆ µ1
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Combining the above results, we have thus far shown that
p
Tnh(ˆ µn,τ − E [ξ (b;n)1(bτ,n ≤ b ≤ b1−τ,n)]) = ˆ µ2
n,τ + op (1).
The term ˆ µ2
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Here the functions h
1
n (·)a n dh
2
n (·) denote the second derivatives with respect to Gn (·)a n dgn (·)
evaluated at some mean values between ˆ Gn (·)a n dGn (·)a n db e t w e e nˆ gn (·)a n dgn (·). We ﬁrst
bound ˆ µ7
n,τ using the uniform convergence rates of ˆ Gn (·)a n dˆ gn (·):
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This follows from a limit variance calculation for U-statistics. Letting bt represent the vector of all


















































1(bτ,n ≤ bit ≤ b1−τ,n).






































































































































































































Finally, we note that if we apply the calculations performed for ˆ µ6
n,τ to ˆ µ5












which then implies that ˆ µ5
n,τ
p
−→ 0. The proof is now completed by putting these terms together.¤
C Large Sample Behavior of the Generalized KS Statistic
Here we describe the asymptotic behavior of the generalized KS statistic ST = ηT¯ δT under H0.A s
we show, ST converges to a maximum functional of a zero-mean Gaussian process with variance-
covariance function described below.
For notational simplicity we consider the case in which only one value of n is used in calculating
¯ δT (i.e., when only two distributions are compared). The general case is a straightforward extension.
We have
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We begin by studying the behavior of Ln
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2 (v)+op (1)
where λ(·)=Λ0 (·)a n dνn = limT→∞
p
T/Tn. ˜ Ln
2 (v) is very similar in structure to partial mean
statistic examined in appendix B, and we therefore only reproduce the key steps of the analysis of40
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d  + op (1)
≡ ¯ Pn (v)+op (1).
It remains to calculate the limit of the covariance function of the process ¯ Pn (v):v ∈ [v, ¯ v]. First
observe that
Va r
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Next, we calculate Cov
¡ ¯ Pn (v), ¯ Pn (v0)
¢
for v 6= v0:
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The cross covariance terms for i 6= j will be of order h. Therefore we can write
Cov































Using the same change of variables used above (and omitting subscripts for simplicity), we obtain
Cov
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Hence, limT→∞ Va r
¡ ¯ Pn (v)
¢
is a special case of limT→∞ Cov
¡ ¯ Pn (v), ¯ Pn (v0)
¢
when v = v0.





where G (v) is a zero-mean Gaussian process deﬁned on v ∈ [v, ¯ v]w i t h
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.
The existence of this nondegenerate limit distribution is the essential result validating the use of
resampling methods to construct the critical values of the test. In practice, resampling methods are
typically the only feasible methods for approximating the asymptotic distributions of functionals of
general Gaussian processes which are diﬃcult to simulate directly.References
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200 replications of each experiment.
PV1 CV1 PV2 CV2
Range of n: 2—4 2—5 2—4 2—5 2—4 3—5 3—5 3—6
Tn 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
share of p-values < 10% 0.21 0.39 1.00 1.00 0.12 0.27 0.94 0.99
share of p-values < 5% 0.11 0.29 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.18 0.91 0.99
Table 2: Monte Carlo Results
Bootstrap Estimation of Σ
200 replications of each experiment.
PV1 CV1 PV2 CV2
Range of n: 2—4 2—5 2—4 3—6 2—4 3—5 3—5 3—6
Tn 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
share of p-values < 10% 0.14 0.18 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.21 0.80 0.91
share of p-values < 5% 0.10 0.12 1.00 1.00 0.04 0.11 0.70 0.83Table 3: Monte Carlo Results
K-S Test using subsampled critical values.a
200 replications of each experiment.
PV1 CV1
Range of n: 2—3 2—4 2—5 2—3 2—4 2—5
Tb 200 200 200 200 200 200
Rc 50 50 50 50 50 50
Sd 151 151 151 151 151 151
%(reject at 5%) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.59 0.92 0.80
%(reject at 10%) 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.88 0.99 0.99
PV2 CV2
Range of n: 2—3 2—4 2—5 2—3 2—4 2—5
T 200 200 200 200 200 200
R 50 50 50 50 50 50
S 151 151 151 151 151 151
%(reject at 5%) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.44 0.82 0.91
%(reject at 10%) 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.86 1.00 1.00




cNumber of auctions in each subsampled dataset.
dNumber of subsamples taken.Table 4: Data Conﬁguration
USFS Timber Auctions
Scaled Sales Lumpsum Sales
number of number of number of number of
auctions bids auctions bids
n = 2 63 126 54 108
n = 3 39 117 40 120
n = 4 42 168 33 132
n = 5 33 165 16 80
n = 6 23 138 18 108
n = 7 14 98 11 77
n =8 4 3 2 6 4 8
n =9 9 8 1 7 6 3
n = 1 01 1 1 1 0 33 0
n = 1 11 1 1 00
n =1 2 4 4 8 3 3 6
TOTAL 243 1094 191 802Table 5: Summary Statistics
USFS Timber Auctions
Scaled Sales Lumpsum Sales
mean std dev mean std dev
number of bidders 4.50 2.47 4.20 2.30
winning bid 80.50 51.49 77.53 46.57
appraised value 36.12 32.56 36.10 29.08
estimated volume 609.89 640.50 390.04 555.86
est. manuf cost 141.51 45.79 153.46 43.08
est. harvest cost 120.57 29.55 118.36 24.92
est. selling value 312.04 75.85 335.74 96.88
species concentration 0.5267 0.5003 0.5497 0.4988
6-month inventory 334161 120445 389821 139625
contract term 7.31 3.27 6.39 3.63
acres 697.78 2925.45 266.82 615.28
region 5 dummy 0.8519 0.6806Table 6: Test Results
Without Instrumental Variables
Scaled Sales
range of n 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7
bid regression R2 .730 .668 .753 .712 .702
means 27.06 31.25 31.07 29.45 26.14
28.25 33.46 33.51 32.78 30.14





means test .505 .670 .737 .795 .845
K-S test .223 .708 .065 .597 .630
Lumpsum Sales
range of n 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7
bid regression R2 .752 .736 .627 .574 .566
means 23.73 22.02 3.52 8.09 9.67
23.85 24.60 5.85 10.62 12.09





means test .499 .090 .621 .807 .788
K-S test .314 .114 .197 .705 .039Table 7: Test Results
With Instrumental Variables
Scaled Sales
range of n 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7
IV regression R2 .172 .134 .178 .190 .215
bid regression R2 .740 .671 .758 .722 .724
means 24.34 37.13 34.53 32.92 34.27
23.74 46.55 37.45 29.35 29.66
36.77 41.09 32.75 37.74
p-values:
means test .442 .343 .668 .488 .627
K-S test .301 .034 .675 .451 .138
Lumpsum Sales
range of n 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7
IV regression R2 .387 .258 .291 .292 .321
bid regression R2 .754 .745 .642 .639 .633
means 28.98 35.43 7.15 33.15 28.33
24.11 24.84 3.48 29.84 24.94
24.18 10.29 28.39 22.82
p-values:
means test .135 .028 .586 .376 .287
K-S test .172 .021 .452 .103 .043Figure 1. Empirical Distributions of Pseudo-values
From One Monte Carlo SampleFigure 2. Empirical Distributions of Pseudo-values
Scaled SalesFigure 3. Empirical Distributions of Pseudo-values
Lumpsum SalesFigure 4. Empirical Distributions of Pseudo-values
Scaled Sales, Using Instrumental VariablesFigure 5. Empirical Distributions of Pseudo-values
Lumpsum Sales, Using Instrumental Variables